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CONTRIBUTIONSt
PRAGMATIC ADJUDICATION
Richard A. Posner*
Pragmatism is at one level a philosophical position, just as scientific realism, transcendental idealism, existentialism, utilitarianism, and logical positivism are. It is the level well illustrated by a
recently published book in which Richard Rorty and his critics go
at each other hammer and tongs over such questions as whether
language reflects reality, whether free will is compatible with a scientific outlook, and whether such questions are even meaningful.'
It is not the level at which this paper is pitched. My concern is with
an issue in "applied" pragmatism, although after listening to Professor Grey's talk at the conference about the independence of
legal from philosophical pragmatism I realize that this term may be
inapt.2 I shall take up that issue at the end. The "applied" issue
t These articles were adapted from papers given at "The Revival of Pragmatism" symposium held in New York on November 3-4, 1995. The symposium was sponsored by the
Center for Humanities and the Ph.D. Programs in English, History, and Philosophy,
CUNY Graduate School; The New York Council for the Humanities and the National
Endowment for the Humanities; The Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies,
The Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; The Simon Rifkind Center
for the Humanities at The City College.
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. This paper is the revised text of a talk given on
November 3,1995, at a conference on "The Revival of Pragmatism" sponsored by the
Center for the Humanities of the City University of New York. I thank Scott Brewer,
William Eskridge, Lawrence Lessig, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, and Cass Sunstein,
along with the commenters and other conference participants, for very helpful suggestions
on an earlier draft.
I RICHARD RORTY, RORTY & PRAGMATISM: THE PHILOSOPHER RESPONDS TO His

CRITICS (Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. ed., 1995). Professor Putnam's talk at the conference
was very much of this character.
2 See also Matthew H. Kramer, The Philosopher-Judge:Some Friendly Criticisms of
Richard Posner's Jurisprudence,59 MOD. L. REV. 465 (1996):
Metaphysical or philosophical pragmatism is a relativist position which denies
that knowledge can be grounded on absolute foundations. Methodological or
intellectual pragmatism is a position that attaches great importance to lively
debate and open-mindedness and flexibility in the sciences, the humanities and
the arts. Political pragmatism is a position that attaches great importance to
civil liberties and to tolerance and to flexible experimentation in the discussions
and institutions that shape the arrangements of human intercourse ....[T]hese
three modes of pragmatism do not entail one another.
Id. at 475-78.
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that is my subject till then is whether adjudication-particularly appellate adjudication-can or should be pragmatic.
The issue is at once spongy and, for me at least, urgent. It is
spongy because "pragmatism" is such a vague term. Among the
Supreme Court Justices who have been called "pragmatists" are
Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, Jackson, Douglas, Brennan, Powell, Stevens, White, and now Breyer;3 others could easily be added
to the list. Among theorists of adjudication, the label has been applied not only to those who call themselves pragmatists, of whom
there are now quite a number,4 but also to Ronald Dworkin,5 who
calls pragmatism, at least Rorty's conception of pragmatism, an intellectual meal fit only for a dog 6 (and I take it he does not much
like dogs). Some might think the inclusion of Frankfurter in my list
even more peculiar than the inclusion of Dworkin. But it is justified by Frankfurter's rejection of First Amendment absolutism, notably in the flag-salute cases, and by his espousal of a "shocks the
conscience" test for substantive due process. This is a refined version of Holmes's "puke" test 7-a statute or other act of government violates the Constitution if and only if it makes you want to
throw up. Can it be an accident that Frankfurter announced his
test in a case about pumping a suspect's stomach for evidence? 8
The "puke" test is shorthand for Holmes's more considered
formulation in his dissent in Lochner: a statute does not work a
deprivation of "liberty" without due process of law "unless it can
be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed [opposed?] would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law." 9 By "fundamental principles" Holmes meant principles of morality so deeply rooted in the judge's being that the judge
would find their rejection incomprehensible. The qualification
"the traditions of our people and our law" is significant, however,
as I shall explain later.
What makes the issue of whether adjudication is or should be
pragmatic an urgent one for me is that my critics do not consider
3 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatismfor the TwentyFirst Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163.
4 For a list, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 388-89 (1995).
5 See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND SOCIETY 89 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991).
6 Ronald Dworkin, Pragmatism,Right Answers, and True Banality, inPRAGMATISM IN
LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 359, 360.
7 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 192.
8 Rochin v. California,.342 U.S. 165 (1952).
9 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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my theory of adjudication pragmatic at all. They think it is in the
spirit of logical positivism, from which pragmatists try to distance
themselves. The logical positivists believed that moral assertions,
because they are neither tautological' ° nor verifiable empirically,
have no truth value at all-are matters purely of taste or of unreasoned emotion. Jeffrey Rosen, for example, argues that my book
Overcoming Law endorses a visceral, personalized, rule-less, freewheeling, unstructured conception of judging.1 ' And well before I
thought of myself as a pragmatist, I was criticized for being "a captive of a thin and unsatisfactory epistemology,"' 2 which is just the
sort of criticism that a purely emotive theory of judging would invite. Am I, then, backsliding? I had better try to make clear what
I think pragmatic adjudication is.
I.
An initial difficulty is that pragmatic adjudication cannot be
derived from pragmatism the philosophical stance. For it would be
entirely consistent with pragmatism the philosophy not to want
judges to be pragmatists, just as it would be entirely consistent with
utilitarianism not to want judges to conceive their role as being to
maximize utility. One might believe, for example, that overall utility would be maximized if judges confined themselves to the application of rules, because discretionary justice, with all the
uncertainty it would create, might be thought on balance to reduce
rather than to increase utility. Similarly, a pragmatist committed to
judging a legal system by the results the system produced might
think the best results would be produced if the judges did not make
pragmatic judgments but simply applied rules. This pragmatist
might, by analogy to rule utilitarianians, be a "rule pragmatist."
So pragmatic adjudication will have to be defended-pragmatically-on its own terms rather than as a corollary of philosophical
pragmatism. (This would be necessary anyway, because of the
vagueness of the philosophical concept.) But what exactly is to be
defended? I do not accept Dworkin's definition: "[t]he pragmatist
10 Some are-for example, "murder is bad," since badness is built into the definition of
"murder" (as distinct from "killing"), at least the popular as distinct from the legal definition. The distinction is important, because some forms of murder in the legal sense, such as
a cuckold's killing the adulterer in flagrante delicto, are not considered morally wrong by a
significant part of the community.
11 Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 581, 584-96 (1995).
12 Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of Judge Richard Posner, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1146, 1161 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND
REFORM (1985)).
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thinks judges should always do the best they can for the future, in
the circumstances, unchecked by any need to respect or secure consistency in principle with what other officials have done or will
do."'13 That is Dworkin the polemicist speaking. But if his definition is rewritten as follows-"a pragmatist judge always tries to do
the best he can do for the present and the future, unchecked by any
felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials
have done in the past"-then I can accept it as a working definition
of the concept of pragmatic adjudication. On this construal the difference between, say, a judge who is a legal positivist in the strong
sense of believing that the law is a system of rules laid down by
legislatures and merely applied by judges, and a pragmatic judge,
is that the former is centrally concerned with securing consistency
with past enactments, while the latter is concerned with securing
consistency with the past only to the extent that such consistency
may happen to conduce to producing the best results for the future.
II.
What does the pragmatic approach to judging entail? What
are the pros and cons (pragmatically evaluated, of course)? And is
it, on balance, the right approach for judges to take?
Consider, to begin with, the differences in the way the judicial
positivist and the judicial pragmatist might weight or order the
materials bearing on the decision of a case. By "judicial positivist"
I mean a judge who believes not only that the positivist account of
law is descriptively accurate-that the meaning of law is exhausted
in positive law-but also that the positivist account should guide
judicial decision-making, in the strong sense that no right should be
recognized or duty imposed that does not have its source in positive law. (A weaker sense will be considered later.) The judicial
positivist would begin and usually end with a consideration of
cases, statutes, administrative regulations, and constitutional provisions-all these and only these being "authorities" to which the
judge must defer in accordance with Dworkin's suggestion that a
judge who is not a pragmatist has a duty to secure consistency in
principle with what other officials have done in the past. If the
authorities all line up in one direction, the decision of the present
case is likely to be foreordained, because to go against the authorities would-unless there are compelling reasons to do so-violate
the duty to the past. The most compelling reason would be that
13 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE

161 (1986).
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some other line of cases had adopted a principle inconsistent with
the authorities directly relevant to the present case. It would be
the judge's duty, by comparing the two lines and bringing to bear
other principles manifest or latent in case law, statute, and constitutional provision, to find the result in the present case that would
promote or cohere with the best interpretation of the legal background as a whole.
The pragmatist judge has different priorities. That judge
wants to come up with the best decision having in mind present
and future needs, and so does not regard the maintenance of consistency with past decisions as an end in itself but only as a means
for bringing about the best results in the present case. The pragmatist is not uninterested in past decisions, in statutes, and so forth.
Far from it. For one thing, these are repositories of knowledge,
even, sometimes, of wisdom, and so it would be folly to ignore
them even if they had no authoritative significance. For another, a
decision that destabilized the law by departing too abruptly from
precedent might have, on balance, bad results. There is often a
trade-off between rendering substantive justice in the case under
consideration and maintaining the law's certainty and predictability. This trade-off, which is perhaps clearest in cases in which a
defense of statute of limitations is raised, will sometimes justify sacrificing substantive justice in the individual case to consistency with
previous cases or with statutes or, in short, with well-founded expectations necessary to the orderly management of society's business. Another reason not to ignore the past is that often it is
difficult to determine the purpose and scope of a rule without tracing the rule to its origins.
The pragmatist judge thus regards precedent, statutes, and
constitutions both as sources of potentially valuable information
about the likely best result in the present case and as signposts that
must not be obliterated or obscured gratuitously, because people
may be relying upon them. But because the pragmatist judge sees
these "authorities" merely as sources of information and as limited
constraints on his freedom of decision, he does not depend upon
them to supply the rule of decision for the truly novel case. For
that he looks also or instead to sources that bear directly on the
wisdom of the rule that he is being asked to adopt or modify.
Some years ago the Supreme Court held that if there are two
possible grounds for dismissing a suit filed in federal court, one
being that it is not within the court's jurisdiction and the other being that the suit has no merit, and if the jurisdictional ground is
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unclear but the lack of merit is clear, the court can dismiss the suit
on the merits without deciding whether there is jurisdiction.14 This
approach is "illogical." Jurisdiction is the power to decide the merits of a claim; so a decision on the merits presupposes jurisdiction.
The pragmatic justification for occasionally putting the merits cart
before the jurisdictional horse begins by asking why federal courts
have a limited jurisdiction and have made rather a fetish of keeping
within its bounds. The answer I think is that these are extraordinarily powerful courts and the concept of limited jurisdiction enables
them both to limit the occasions for the exercise of power and to
demonstrate self-restraint.1 5 But if the case clearly lacks merits, a
decision so holding will not enlarge federal judicial power but will
merely exercise it well within its outer bounds. So if the question
of jurisdiction is unclear in a case whose lack of merit is clear, the
prudent and economical course may be to skip over the jurisdictional question and dismiss the case on the merits.
Here is another example of the difference between positivistic.
and pragmatic adjudication. When oil and gas first became commercially valuable, the question arose whether they should be
treated like other "mobile" resources, such as wild animals, where
the rule of the common law was (and is) that you have no property
right until you take possession of the animal, or, instead, like land
and other "stable" property, 16 title to which can be obtained by
recording a deed in a public registry or by some other paper record
without the owner having to take physical possession of the good. 7
A judicial positivist who was asked whether only possessory rights
should be recognized in oil and gas would be likely to start with the
cases on property rights in wild animals and consider whether oil
and gas are enough "like" them to justify subsuming these minerals
under the legal concept of ferae naturae, meaning that only property rights obtained by possession would be enforced. (So no one
could own oil until it was pumped to the surface.) The pragmatic
judge would be more inclined to start with the teachings of natural
resources economists and oil and gas engineers, to use their expert
Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976).
To quote Isabel in Measure for Measure: "0, it is excellent to have a giant's strength,
but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant!" WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEA14
15

SURE act 2, sc. 2.

16 A chair, for example: it moves only when someone moves it, whereas gravity or air
pressure will cause oil and gas to flow into an empty space even if no (other) force is
applied. I think that when the animal rules were first applied to oil and gas, these resources were erroneously thought to have an internal principle of motion, to "move on
their own," like animals.
17 1 set to one side property that is not physical at all, i.e., intellectual property.
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advice in deciding which regime of property rights (possessory or
title) would produce the better results when applied to
oil and gas,
and only then to examine the wild-animal cases and other
authorities to see whether they might block, by operation of the
doctrine
of stare decisis, the decision that would be best for the exploitation
of oil and gas.
I am aware that the pragmatic judge may fall on his face.
The
judge may not be able to understand what the petroleum
engineers
and the economists are trying to tell him or to translate
it into a
workable legal rule. The plodding positivist, his steps wholly
predictable, will at least promote stability in law, a genuine
public
good, and the legislature can always step in and prescribe
an economically sound scheme of property rights. That is pretty
the history of property rights in oil and gas. Perhaps nothing much
better
could realistically be expected. But American legislatures,
in
contrast to European parliaments, are so sluggish when it
comes to
correcting judicial mistakes that a heavy burden of legal
creativity
falls inescapably on judicial shoulders. I do not think
judges can bear the burden unless they are pragmatists. that the
But I admit that they will not be able to bear it comfortably until
changes in
legal education and practice make law a more richly
theoretical,
policy-saturated, and empirical, and less formalistic and
casuistic,
field.
My third example is a current focus of controversy: the
issue
of the enforceability of contracts of surrogate motherhood.
In
holding them unenforceable the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, in
the Baby M case," engaged in a labored and rather windy
legal sources and concepts, overlooking the two issues, both tour of
factual
in the broad sense, that would matter most to a pragmatist.
The
first is whether women who agree to be surrogate mothers
typically
or at least frequently experience intense regret when the
moment
comes to surrender the newborn baby to the father and
his wife.
The second is whether contracts of surrogate motherhood
are typically or frequently exploitive in the sense that the surrogate
mother
is a poor woman who enters into the contract out of desperation.
If the answers to both questions are "no," then, given the
benefits
of the contracts to the signatories, the pragmatist judge
would
probably enforce such contracts. 19
These examples should help us see that while both the positivist and the pragmatist are interested in the authorities and
the facts
18
19

In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND

REASON

420-28 (1992).
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(broadly construed-I am not talking only or even mainly about
the facts developed at a trial through testimony, exhibits, and
cross-examination), the positivist starts with and gives more weight
to the authorities, while the pragmatist starts with and gives more
weight to the facts. This is the most succinct description of pragmatic adjudication that I can come up with and it helps incidentally
to explain two features of Holmes's judicial philosophy that seem
at first glance antipathetic to pragmatic adjudication: his lack of
interest, of which Brandeis complained, in economic and other
data, and his reluctance to overrule previous decisions. A pragmatic judge believes that the future should not be a slave to the
past, but he need not have faith in any particular bodies of data as
guides to making the decision that will best serve the future. If like
Holmes you lacked confidence that you or anyone else had any
very clear idea of what the best decision on some particular issue
would be, the pragmatic posture would be one of reluctance to
overrule past decisions, since the effect of overruling would be to
sacrifice certainty and stability for a merely conjectural gain.
I have said nothing about the pragmatic judge exercising a
"legislative" function, although the kind of facts that he would
need in order to decide the oil and gas case in pragmatic fashion
would be the kind that students of administrative law call "legislative" to distinguish them from the sort of facts ("adjudicative")
that judge and jury, cabined by the rules of evidence, are called
upon to find. Holmes said that judges were "interstitial" legislators
whenever they were called upon to decide a case the outcome of
which was not dictated by unquestioned authorities. This is a misleading usage because of the many differences in procedures, training, experience, outlook, knowledge, tools, timing, constraints, and
incentives between judges and legislators; scope is not the only difference, as Holmes's formulation suggests. What he should have
said was that judges are rulemakers as well as rule appliers. A
judge is a different kind of rulemaker from a legislator. An appellate judge has to decide in particular cases whether to apply an old
rule unmodified, modify and apply the old rule, or create and apply
a new rule. If he is a pragmatist his decision-making process will
be guided by the goal of making the choice that will produce the
best results. To make that choice he will have to do more than
consult cases, statutes, regulations, constitutions, conventional
legal treatises, and other orthodox legal materials.
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I want to examine a little more systematically the objections to
the pragmatic approach to judging. One objection to inviting the
judge, as I just did, to stray beyond the boundaries of the orthodox
legal materials of decision is that judges are not trained to analyze
and absorb the theories and data of social science. The example of
Brandeis is not reassuring. Although Brandeis was a brilliant man
of wide intellectual interests, his forays into social sciencewhether as advocate or as judge-were far from an unqualified
success. Indeed, most social scientists today would probably agree
that Brandeis's indefatigable industry in marshaling economic data
and viewing them through the lens of economic theory was largely
misguided. It led him to support (and to try to make a part of the
law) such since discredited policies as limiting women's employment rights, fostering small business at the expense of large, and
encouraging public utility and common carrier regulation. Holmes,
as I have said, had reservations about the reliability of social scientific theories, but his unshakable faith in the eugenics movement,
an early twentieth-century product of social and biological theory,
undergirds his most criticized opinion (incidentally one joined by
Brandeis)-Buck v. Bell.2 ° One of the deformities of the majority
opinion in Roe v. Wade 21 is that the opinion makes it seem that the
issue of abortion rights is a medical one and that the reason for
invalidating state laws forbidding abortion is simply that they interfere with the autonomy of the medical profession-a "practical"
angle reflecting Justice Blackmun's long association with the Mayo
Clinic. The effects of abortion laws on women, children, and the
family, which are the effects that are important to evaluating the
laws, are not considered.
A second and related objection to the use of nonlegal materials to decide cases is that it is bound often to degenerate into "gut
reaction" judging. I think that this appraisal is basically correctprovided the phrase "gut reaction" is taken figuratively rather than
literally-but that the word "degenerate" is too strong. Cases do
not wait upon the accumulation of some critical mass of social scientific knowledge that will enable the properly advised judge to
arrive at the decision that will have the best results. The decisions
of the Supreme Court in the area of sexual and reproductive autonomy, for example, came in advance of reliable, comprehensive, and
20 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("Three generations of imbeciles are enough").
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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accessible scholarship on sexuality, the family, and the status of
women. The Court had to decide whether capital punishment is
cruel and unusual punishment at a time when the scientific study of
the deterrent effects of capital punishment was just beginning.
When the Court decided to redistrict the nation according to the
"one man, one vote" principle it cannot have had a clear idea
about its effects, on which political scientists still do not agree more
than thirty years later. The examples are not limited to the
Supreme Court or to constitutional law. Common law judges had
to resolve such issues as whether to extend the domain of strict
liability, substitute comparative negligence for contributory negligence, simplify the rules of occupiers' liability, excuse breach of
contract because of impossibility of performance, limit consequential damages, enforce waivers of tort liability, and so forth long
before economists and economically minded lawyers got around to
studying the economic consequences of these choices. When
judges try to make the decision that will produce the "best results,"
without having any body of organized knowledge to turn to for
help in making that decision, it seems they must rely on their
intuitions.
The fancy term for the body of bedrock beliefs that guide decision is natural law. Does this mean that the pragmatic approach to
adjudication is just another version of the natural law approach? I
think not. The pragmatist does not look to God or other transcendental sources of moral principle to validate his departures from
statute or precedent or other conventional "sources" of law. He
does not have the confidence of secure foundations and .this should
make him a little more tentative, cautious, and piecemeal in imposing his vision of the Good on society in the name of legal justice. If
Holmes really thought he was applying a "puke" test to statutes
challenged as unconstitutional rather than evaluating those statutes
for conformity with transcendental criteria, it would help explain
his restrained approach to constitutional adjudication. On the
other hand, a pragmatic Justice such as Robert Jackson, who unlike
Holmes had a rich background of involvement in high-level political questions, was not bashful in drawing upon his extrajudicial
experience for guidance to the content of constitutional doctrine.22
The pragmatic judge is not always a modest judge.
22

Quite the contrary. As he said in his famous concurrence in the steel-seizure case,
That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical
advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has
served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety.
While an interval of detached reflection may temper teachings of that experi-
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The reason that using the "puke" test or one's "gut reactions"
or even one's pre-judicial high-governmental experiences to make
judicial decisions sounds scandalous 23 is that the legal profession,
and particularly its academic and judicial branches, want the added
legitimacy that accrues to the decisions of people whose opinions
are grounded in expert knowledge. The expert knowledge of another discipline is not what is wanted, although it is better than no
expert knowledge at all. Both the law professor and the judge feel
naked before society when the positions they take on novel caseshowever carefully those positions are dressed up in legal jargonare seen to reflect unstructured intuition based on personal and
professional (but nonjudicial) experiences, and on character and
temperament, rather than on disciplined, rigorous, and articulate
inquiry.
Things are not quite so bad as that. It is not as if American
judges were chosen at random and made political decisions in a
vacuum. Judges of the higher American courts are generally
picked from the upper tail of the population distribution in terms
of age, education, intelligence, disinterest, and sobriety. They are
not tops in all these departments but they are well above average,
at least in the federal courts because of the elaborate pre-appointment screening of candidates for federal judgeships. Judges are
schooled in a profession that sets a high value on listening to both
sides of an issue before making up one's mind, on sifting truth from
falsehood, and on exercising a detached judgment. Their decisions
are anchored in the facts of concrete disputes between real people.
Members of the legal profession have played a central role in the
political history of the United States, and the profession's institutions and usages reflect the fundamental political values that have
emerged from that history. Appellate judges in nonroutine cases
are expected to express as best they can the reasons for their decision in signed, public documents (the published decisions of these
courts); this practice creates accountability and fosters a certain reflectiveness and self-discipline. None of these things guarantees
wisdom, especially since the reasons given for a decision are not
always the real reasons behind it. But at their best, American apence, they probably are a more realistic influence on my views than the conventional materials of judicial decision which seem unduly to accentuate doctrine
and legal fiction.
Youngstown Sheet & Ttbe Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
23 Making the statement by Justice Jackson that I quoted in the preceding footnote
remarkable for its candor; but am I mistaken in sensing a faintly apologetic tone?
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pellate courts are councils of wise elders and it is not completely
insane to entrust them with responsibility for deciding cases in a
way that will produce the best results in the circumstances rather
than just deciding cases in accordance with rules created by other
organs of government or in accordance with their own previous
decisions, although that is what they will be doing most of the time.
Nor do I flinch from another implication of conceiving American appellate courts in the way I have suggested: these courts will
tend to treat the Constitution and the common law, and to a lesser
extent bodies of statute law, as a kind of putty that can be used to
fill embarrassing holes in the legal framework. Such an approach is
not inevitable. In the case of property rights in oil and gas, a court
could take the position that it had no power to create new rules
and must therefore subsume these newly valuable resources under
the closest existing rule, the rule governing wild animals. It might
even take the position that it had no power to enlarge the boundaries of existing rules, and in that event no property rights in oil and
gas would be recognized until the legislature created a system of
property rights for these resources. Under this approach, if Connecticut has a crazy law (as it did until Griswold v. Connecticut24
struck it down) forbidding married couples to use contraceptives,
and no provision of the Constitution limits state regulation of the
family, the crazy law will stand until it is repealed or the Constitution amended to invalidate it. Or if the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has reference only
to the method of punishment or to the propriety of punishing at all
in particular circumstances (for example, for simply being poor, or
an addict), then a state can with constitutional impunity sentence a
sixteen-year old to life imprisonment without possibility of parole
for the sale of one marijuana cigarette-which in fact seems to be
the Supreme Court's current view,25 one that I find very difficult to
stomach. I do not think a pragmatic Justice of the Supreme Court
would stomach it, although he or she would give due weight to the
implications for judicial caseloads of bringing the length of prison
sentences under judicial scrutiny, and to the difficulty of working
out defensible norms of proportionality. The pragmatic judge is
unwilling to throw up his hands and say "sorry, no law to apply"
when confronted with outrageous conduct that the Constitution's
framers neglected to foresee and make specific provision for.

24
25

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
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Oddly, this basic principle of pragmatic judging has received at
least limited recognition by even the most orthodox judges in the
case of statutes. It is accepted that if reading a statute the way it is
written would produce absurd results, the judges may in effect rewrite it. 26 Most judges do not put it quite this way-they say statu-

tory interpretation is a search for meaning and Congress can't have
meant the absurd result-but it comes to the same thing. And, at
least in this country, common law judges reserve the right to "rewrite" the common law as they go along. I am merely suggesting
that a similar approach, prudently employed, is the pragmatic approach to constitutional adjudication as well.
I do not belittle the dangers of the approach. People can feel
very strongly about a subject and be quite wrong. Certitude is not
the test of certainty. A wise person realizes that even his unshakable convictions may be wrong-but not all of us are wise. In a
pluralistic society, moreover, which America seems to be more and
more every year, a judge's unshakable convictions may not be
shared by enough other people that he can base a decision on those
convictions and be reasonably confident it will be accepted. So the
wise judge will try to check his convictions against those of some
broader community of opinion, as suggested by Holmes in his dissent in Lochner. It was not irrelevant, from a pragmatic standpoint, to the outcome of Brown v. Board of Education2 7 that
official racial segregation had been abolished outside the South2"
and bore a disturbing resemblance to Nazi racial laws. It was not
irrelevant to the outcome of Griswold v. Connecticut that, as the
Court neglected to mention, only one other state (Massachusetts)
had a similar law. If I were writing an opinion invalidating the life
sentence in my hypothetical marijuana case I would look at the
punishments for this conduct in other states and in the foreign
countries, such as England and France, that we consider in some
sense our peers. If a law could be said to be contrary to world
public opinion I would consider this a reason, not compelling but
not negligible either, for regarding a state law as unconstitutional
even if the Constitution's text had to be stretched a bit to cover it.
The study of other laws, or of world public opinion as crystallized
in foreign law and practices, is a more profitable inquiry than trying to find some bit of eighteenth-century evidence that maybe the
26 See, e.g., Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136-37 (1991); Green v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
27 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28 Which for these purposes, however, included the District of Columbia! See Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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framers of the Constitution wanted courts to make sure punishments prescribed by statute were proportional to the gravity, or
difficulty of apprehension, or profitability, or some other relevant
characteristic of the crime. If I found such evidence I would think
it a valuable bone to toss to a positivist or formalist colleague but I
would not be embarrassed by its absence because I would not think
myself duty-bound to maintain consistency with past decisions.
I would even think it pertinent to the pragmatic response to
my hypothetical marijuana case to investigate or perhaps even just
to speculate (if factual investigation proved fruitless) about the
psychological and social meaning of imprisoning a young person
for his entire life for the commission of a minor crime. What happens to a person in such a situation? Does he adjust? Deteriorate?
What is the likely impact on his family, and on the larger society?
How should one feel as a judge if one allows such a punishment to
be imposed? And are these sentences "for real," or are preposterously severe sentences soon commuted? Could it be that the
deterrent effect of so harsh a sentence will be so great that the total
number of years of imprisonment for violation of the drug laws will
be reduced, making the sacrifice of this young person a utility-maximizing venture after all? Is utility the right criterion here? Is the
sale of marijuana perhaps far more destructive than some ivorytower judge or professor thinks? Do judges become callous if a
large proportion of the criminal cases they review involve very long
sentences? Need we fear that if a defendant appealed who received "only" a five-year sentence the appellate judge's reaction
would be: "Why are you complaining about such a trivial

punishment?

29

The response to the hypothetical case of the young man sentenced to life for selling marijuana is bound in the end to be an
emotional rather than a closely reasoned one because so many imponderables enter into that response, as my questions were intended to indicate. But emotion is not pure glandular secretion. It
is influenced by experience, 30 information, and imagination, 31 and
can thus be, to some extent anyway, disciplined by fact. Indignation or disgust founded on a responsible appreciation of a situation
29 1 believe in fact that this is increasingly the reaction of federal appellate judges, as
federal sentences become ever longer and the number of criminal appeals ever greater.
30 I refer the reader once again to the striking quotation from Justice Jackson, supra
note 22.
31 This is the theme of Martha C. Nussbaum's 1993 Gifford Lectures. See MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: A THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS (forthcoming 1997)

(on file with author).
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need not be thought a disreputable motive for action, even for a
judge; it is indeed the absence of any emotion in such a situation
that would be discreditable. It would be nice, though, if judges and
law professors were more knowledgeable practitioners or at least
consumers of social science (broadly defined to include history and
philosophy), so that their "emotional" judgments were better
informed.
My earlier reference to the ages of judges suggests another
objection to pragmatic adjudication. Aristotle said, and I agree,
that young people tend to be forward-looking. Their lives lie
mainly ahead of them and they have only a limited stock of experience to draw upon in coping with the future, while old people tend
to be backward-looking because they face an opposite balance between past and future.32 If, therefore, a pragmatic judge is forward-looking, does that mean we should invert the age profile of
judges? Should Holmes have been made a judge at thirty and put
out to pasture at fifty? Or, on the contrary, do not judges perform
an important "balance wheel" function, one that requires them to
be backward-looking, one that is peculiarly apt, therefore, for the
aged? Have I not argued this myself33 and also pointed out that,
contrary to the conventional view, the great failing of the German
judges in the Nazi period was not their positivism but their insistence on interpreting and applying the laws of the New Order to
34
further the aims and the spirit of those laws?
These criticisms pivot on an ambiguity in the term "forwardlooking." If it is meant to carry overtones of disdain for history,
origins, and traditions, then the criticisms I have mentioned are entirely just. But I do not myself understand "forward-looking" in
that sense. I understand it to mean that the past is valued not in
itself but only in relation to the present and the future. That relation may be a very important one. The best the judge can do for
the present and the future may be to insist that breaks with the past
be duly considered. That would be entirely consistent with pragmatism; it would be positivism-as-pragmatism. All that would be
missing would be a sense of reverence for the past, a felt "duty" of
continuity with the past. That reverence, that sense of duty, would
32

I elaborate upon Aristotle's view in my book Aging and Old Age. See

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE ch. 5 (1995).
33 See id. at ch. 8.
34 POSNER, supra note 4, at 155. I would not be inclined to swing to the other extreme

and blame Nazi jurisprudence on pragmatism. National Socialism was not a pragmatic
faith.
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be inconsistent with the forward-looking stance, and hence with
pragmatism.
I think likewise that pragmatism is wholly neutral with regard
to the question whether the law should be dominated by rules or
by standards. The pragmatist rejects the idea that law is not law
unless it consists of rules, because that kind of conceptual analysis
is not pragmatic. But he is open to any pragmatic argument in
favor of rules, for example that judges cannot be trusted to make
intelligent decisions unless they are guided by rules, or that decisions based on standards produce uncertainty disproportionate to
any gain in flexibility. A pragmatic judge thus need not be recognizable by a distinctive style of judging. What would be distinctive
would be that the style (of thinking-he might decide to encapsulate his thoughts in positivist or formalist rhetoric) owed nothing to
ideas about the nature of law or the moral duty to abide by past
decisions or some other nonpragmatic grounding of judicial attitudes. I likewise leave open the criteria for the "best results" for
which the pragmatic judge is striving. They are not what is best for
the particular case without consideration of the implications for
other cases. Pragmatism will not tell us what is best but, provided
there is a fair degree of value consensus among the judges, as I
think there still is in this country, it can help judges seek the best
results unhampered by philosophical doubts.
The greatest danger of judicial pragmatism is intellectual laziness. It is a lot simpler to react to a case than to analyze it. The
pragmatic judge must bear in mind at all times that he is a judge
and that this means he must consider all the legal materials and
arguments that can be brought to bear upon the case. If legal reasoning is modestly defined as reasoning with reference to distinctive legal materials such as statutes and legal doctrines and to the
law's traditional preoccupations, for example with stability, the
right to be heard, and the other "rule of law" virtues, then it
ought to be an ingredient of every legal decision, though not necessarily the decision's be-all and end-all. Just as some people think
an artist must prove he is a competent draftsman before he can be
taken seriously as an abstract artist, so I believe that a judge must
prove-anew in every case-that he is a competent legal reasoner
before he can be taken seriously as a pragmatic judge.
To put this point differently, the pragmatic judge must never
forget that he is a judge and that the role of a judge is constraining
35

As in Joseph Raz, On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning, in ETHICS

DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS

310 (1994).
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as well as empowering. Several years ago the Chicago public
schools were unable to open at the beginning of the school year
because the state refused to approve the school district's budget.
An injunction was sought to compel the schools to open on the
ground that their closure violated a judicial decree forbidding de
facto racial segregation in the city's public schools. The argument
was not that the state's refusal to approve the budget had been
motivated by any racial animus-there was no suggestion of thatbut that the ultimate goal of the desegregation decree, which was
to improve the education and life prospects of black children in
Chicago, would be thwarted if the schools were not open to educate them. The trial judge granted the request for an injunction on
an avowedly pragmatic ground: the cost to Chicago's schoolchildren, of whatever race, of being denied an education. My court
reversed. 36 We could not find any basis in federal law for the injunction. The desegregation decree had not commanded the City
to open the public schools on some particular date, or for that matter to open them at all, or even to have public schools, let alone to
flout a state law requiring financial responsibility in the administration of the public school system. It seemed to us that what the
judge had done was not so much pragmatic as lawless. Even if one
rejects the view, as do I, that pragmatism requires judges to eschew
pragmatic adjudication, they must not ignore the good of compliance with settled rules of law. If a federal judge is free to issue an
injunction that has no basis in federal law merely because he thinks
the injunction will have good results, then we do not have pragmatic adjudication; we have judicial tyranny, which few Americans
consider acceptable even if they are persuaded that the tyrant can
be counted on to be generally benign.
The judge in the Chicago school case was guilty of what might
be called myopic pragmatism, which may be Dworkin's conception
of pragmatism. The only consequence the judge took into consideration in deciding whether to issue the injunction was that children enrolled in the public schools would be deprived of schooling
until the schools opened. The consequence that he ignored was the
consequence for the political and governmental systems of granting
federal judges an uncanalized discretion to intervene in political
disputes. Had the power that the judge claimed been upheld, you
can be sure that henceforth the financing of Chicago's public
schools would be determined by a federal judge rather than by
elected officials. The judge thought that unless he ordered the
36

United States v. Board of Educ., 11 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993).
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schools to open, the contending parties would never agree on a
budget. The reverse was true. Only the fact that the schools were
closed exerted pressure on the parties to settle their dispute. And
indeed, as soon as the court of appeals lifted the injunction, the
parties came to terms and the schools opened. The consequence
the judge ignored was a consequence for the schoolchildren as well
as for other members of society, so that it is possible that even the
narrowest group affected by the decree would, in the long run,
have been hurt had the decree been allowed to stand.
If intellectual laziness is a danger of pragmatic adjudication,
and I think it is, it is also a danger of not being pragmatic. The
conventional judge is apt not to question his premises. If he thinks
that "hate speech" is deeply harmful, or that banning hate speech
would endanger political liberty, he is not likely to take the next
step, which is to recognize that he may be wrong and to seek
through investigation to determine whether he is wrong.37 The
deeper the belief-the closer it lies to our core values-the less
likely we are to question it. Our disposition will be not to question
but to defend. As Peirce and Dewey emphasized, doubt rather
than belief is the spur to inquiry; and doubt is a disposition that
pragmatism encourages, precisely in order to spur inquiry. One
reason that attitudes toward hate speech are held generally as dogmas rather than hypotheses-one reason that so little is known
about the actual consequences of hate speech-is that a pragmatic
approach has not been taken to the subject.
IV.
I have been trying to explain my conception of pragmatic adjudication and to defend it against the critics of pragmatic adjudication. But I would not like to leave the impression that I think
pragmatic adjudication is the right way for all courts to go. Philosophical pragmatism-although one can find echoes or anticipations of it in German philosophy and elsewhere (Hume, Nietzsche,
and Wittgenstein, for example)-is basically an American philosophy, and it may not travel well to other countries. The Same may
be true for pragmatic adjudication. Concretely, the case for such
adjudication is weaker in a parliamentary democracy than in a
U.S.-style checks-and-balances federalist democracy. Many parlia37 My discussion of this subject was stimulated by a very interesting paper by Michel
Rosenfeld. See Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner's and Rorty's Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 97
(1996).
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mentary systems (notably the English, which is the one I know
best) are effectively unicameral and, what is more, the parliament
is controlled by the executive. The legislative branch of so highly
centralized a system can pass new laws pretty easily and rapidly
and word them clearly. If the courts identify a gap in existing law,
they can be reasonably confident that it will be quickly filled by
Parliament, so that only a temporary injustice will be done if the
judges refrain from filling the gap themselves. Thus English judges
can afford to be stodgier, more rule-bound, less pragmatic than our
judges; the cost in substantive injustice is lower.
Some parliamentary systems have a federal structure, some
have constitutional review, and some have both. Some, the English for example, have neither. The ones that have neither have
much clearer law, whereas to determine someone's legal obligation
in the United States will often require consideration of state law
(and perhaps the laws of several states), federal statutory law (and
sometimes federal common law), and state and federal constitutional law. Our government is one of the most decentralized in the
world. We have effectively a tricameral federal legislature, since
the President through his veto power and his role in either of the
major political parties is a full participant in the legislative process.
This tricameral structure makes it extremely difficult to pass laws,
let alone clearly worded laws (unclear wording in a contract or a
statute facilitates agreement on the contract or statute as a whole
by deferring resolution of the most contentious points). Moreover,
the tricameral federal structure is layered on top of similarly threeheaded state legislatures. American courts cannot, if they want
"the best results," leave all rulemaking to legislatures, for that
would result in legal gaps and perversities galore. The lateral-entry
character of the American judiciary, the absence of uniform criteria for appointment, the moral, intellectual, and political diversity
of the nation (and hence, given the previous two points, of the
judges), the individualistic and anti-authoritarian character of the
population, the extraordinary complexity and dynamism of the society-all are further obstacles to American judges confining themselves to the application of rules laid down by legislatures,
regulators, or the framers of the Constitution.
I am exaggerating the differences between the systems. But it
is more natural for an English or an Austrian or a Danish judge to
think of himself or herself as mainly just a rule applier than it is for
an American judge to do so, and since there are good pragmatic
arguments in favor of judicial modesty, it is far from clear that Eng-
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lish or Austrian or Danish judges would be right, on pragmatic
grounds, to become pragmatic adjudicators. I do not think that
American appellate judges have a choice.
V.
I said I would come back to the question whether it is accurate
to describe this as a paper in "applied" pragmatism. I conjecture
two relations between philosophical and legal pragmatism. First,
the tendency of most philosophical speculation-and it is what
makes philosophy, despite the remoteness of most of it from quotidian concerns, a proper staple of college education-is to shake
up a person's presuppositions, so that if he happens to be a judge
or lawyer reading philosophy he is likely to feel the presuppositions that define his professional culture shift beneath him. Philosophy, especially the philosophy of pragmatism, incites doubt, and
doubt incites inquiry, making the judge less of a dogmatic, more of
a pragmatic, adjudicator.
Second, philosophy, theology, and law have to a significant extent parallel conceptual structures. This is not surprising, since
Christian theology was so heavily influenced by Greek and Roman
philosophy, and Western law by Christianity. The orthodox versions of the three systems of thought contain rather similar positions on matters such as scientific and moral realism, free will, and
mind-body dualism. A challenge to any of the systems, therefore,
is a challenge to all three. Pragmatism in its role (which it shares
with logical positivism-and here it should be pointed out that to
the nonspecialist the similarities among the characteristic modern
schools of philosophy are more conspicuous than the differences 38 )
as skeptical challenger to orthodox philosophy encourages a skeptical view of the foundations of orthodox law with its many parallels to orthodox philosophy. That is why Rorty, who rarely
discusses legal issues, is cited so frequently in law reviews.
Philosophical pragmatism does not dictate legal pragmatism or
any other jurisprudential stance. But it may play a paternal and
enabling role in relation to pragmatic theories of law, including the
theory of pragmatic adjudication that I have tried to sketch in this
paper.

38 Hilary Putnam's brand of pragmatism, for example, as was plain from his talk at the
conference, is a position within, rather than against, analytic philosophy.
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